Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 1:

In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

On January 4, 1965, one day after the 89th Congress convened, President Lyndon B. Johnson referenced presidential succession and inability in his State of the Union Speech.1

, Am. Presidency Project, >http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-the-union-26. Johnson noted that “[e]ven the best of government is subject to the worst of hazards.” 2 He promised to “propose laws to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the President become disabled or die.” 3 On January 6, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana reintroduced his presidential succession and inability amendment from the 88th Congress as S.J. Res. 1, and it was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.4 Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced identical legislation in the House as H.J. Res. 1.5

On January 28, President Johnson wrote a special message to Congress on presidential inability.6

, Am. Presidency Project, >http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-presidential-disability-and-related-matters. Invoking national security concerns, Johnson called for Congress to propose an amendment to the Constitution providing for “orderly continuity” in the presidency to address “long-recognized defects.” 7 In Johnson’s view, these defects included gaps in the Constitution on the issues of presidential inability and vice-presidential succession.8

The next month, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S.J. Res. 1 favorably with amendments.9 The revised resolution proposed an amendment to the Constitution on presidential vacancy, vice presidential vacancy, and presidential inability.10 According to the committee’s report, one of the amendment’s key purposes was to encourage the President to relinquish his powers and duties voluntarily in the event of inability by assuring that he could resume his office upon recovery in such circumstances.11 The committee wrote that a constitutional amendment was necessary because of uncertainty over whether Congress could achieve the committee’s goals by legislation and a need to ensure presidential successors’ legal and political legitimacy.12

The House Judiciary Committee favorably reported H.J. Res. 1 with amendments that designated specific congressional officers to receive presidential inability determinations and specifically allowed the President to resume office upon recovery from a self-declared inability without challenge.13 The committee also clarified that only certain Cabinet-level officers should participate in presidential inability determinations unless Congress provided by law for a different body to exercise that function jointly with the Vice President.14 The committee specified a ten-day deadline for Congress to assemble and decide disputes between the President and other relevant officials on the issue of presidential inability.15

On February 19, 1965, the Senate unanimously approved the revised S.J. Res. 1.16 The House approved the revised H.J. Res. 1 as a substitute for the Senate joint resolution on April 13, 1965 by a vote of 368 to 29.17

Footnotes

1

Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union

, Am. Presidency Project, >http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-the-union-26.

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

111 Cong. Rec. 290 (1965).

5

Id. at 89.

6

Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters

, Am. Presidency Project, >http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-presidential-disability-and-related-matters.

7

Id.

8

Id. Johnson also advocated for electoral college reform and measures to address the death or inability of a President- or Vice President-elect between Election Day and the President’s inauguration. Id.

9

S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 1–2 (1965). The Judiciary Committee’s amendments to the joint resolution required public notice of presidential inability determinations, even when Congress was not in session, by transmission to congressional presiding officers. Id. at 2. The amendments also replaced the phrase “heads of the executive departments” with “principal officers of the executive departments” in Section 4 in an effort to ensure “that only those members of the President’s official Cabinet were to participate in any decision of disability.” Id.

10

Id. at 1–2.

11

S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 3 (1965).

12

Id. at 11.

13

H. Rep. No. 89-203, at 1–3 (1965).

14

Id. at 3 ( “The intent of the committee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive departments named in 5 United States Code 1 [now § 101], or any executive department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the President’s Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in determining inability. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of the department would be authorized to participate in a presidential inability determination.” ).

15

See id.; 111 Cong. Rec. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7956 (statement of Rep. Randall) (arguing that the deadline for Congress to decide presidential inability would help to prevent “an uncooperative and hostile Congress [from prolonging] inability proceedings indefinitely and through inaction [keep] an otherwise fit and healthy President from resuming office” ).

16

111 Cong. Rec. 3286 (1965).

17

111 Cong. Rec. 7968–69 (1965).