criminal procedure

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

 

Arthur Andersen LLP was convicted of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). The 5th Circuit upheld the conviction, despite Andersen's claims that prosecution did not enter evidence about the numerous documents Andersen did not destroy, that the judge allowed improper evidence of past SEC investigations of Andersen, and that the judge misrepresented the offense in the jury instructions with regards to actual knowledge that certain actions constituted a crime under the circumstances and timing of the commission of the actions. Andersen again challenges the conviction, this time before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Arthur Andersen LLP's conviction for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) must be reversed because the jury instructions upheld by the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the elements of the offense, in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits.

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Bloate v. United States

Issues

Is time to prepare pretrial motions, when requested by the defendant, automatically excluded from calculating the Speedy Trial Act’s requirement that trials occur within seventy days of an indictment, or the defendant’s first appearance in court, whichever is later?

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The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (“STA”) requires that a criminal defendant be brought to trial within seventy days of either his or her indictment or first appearance in court. Under the STA, several delays are automatically excluded from the seventy-day period, including delays related to pretrial motions. During the lead-up to Taylor Bloate’s (“Bloate”) trial, the District Court granted then-defendant Bloate’s request for extra time to prepare pretrial motions. At issue in this case is whether the time to prepare pretrial motions, when requested by a defendant, is automatically excluded from the STA’s seventy-day period. If this preparation time is included, the period between Bloate’s indictment and trial would exceed seventy days, and Bloate’s indictment would not stand. Conversely, if it is not included, the period would be less than seventy days, and Bloate’s indictment would stand. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve a circuit court split and will also have significant effects on federal criminal procedure, the interests of criminal defendants, the and the interests of the general public in maintaining a fair and efficient criminal justice system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is excludable under §3161(h)(1). As the Eighth Circuit explicitly acknowledged below, this question has divided the courts of appeals. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have answered it in the negative; the Eighth Circuit and seven other circuits have answered it in the affirmative.

Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (“STA”), a criminal defendant is entitled to a trial within seventy days after an indictment is issued, or the defendant’s first appearance before a federal court, whichever is later. See 18 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

·      Annotated U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment (Speedy Trial)

·      U.S. Department of Justice: Speedy Trial Act

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Boyer v. Louisiana

The State of Louisiana indicted Jonathan Edward Boyer for the murder of Bradlee Marsh in 2002, but the case did not proceed to trial until 2009. The trial resulted in Boyer’s conviction, and a state appellate court affirmed. Boyer now argues before the Supreme Court that Louisiana violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Specifically, Boyer alleges that five years of delay were caused entirely by Louisiana’s failure to fund his appointed, capitally-certified counsel and that this funding failure should be weighed against the state. Louisiana counters that Boyer has no constitutional right to capitally-certified counsel and that Boyer, not the State, is responsible for the delay. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will determine whether a state’s failure to fund appointed, specially-qualified counsel for an indigent capital defendant should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes. The decision may substantially affect indigent defendants’ constitutional rights as well as state procedures for providing indigent capital defense.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years, particularly where failure was the direct result of the prosecution’s choice to seek the death penalty, should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes?

Issue

Whether the State of Louisiana’s five-year failure to fund appointed, specially-qualified counsel for an indigent defendant in a capital case should be weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes?

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Bradshaw v. Stumpf

 

John Stumpf and his accomplice, Clyde Wesley, were convicted of the murder of Mary Jane Stout. Stumpf, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, argues that the prosecutor unfairly used inconsistent theories to prove that both he and Wesley were guilty for the murder – -- even though a single shot was used to kill Stout. Stumpf thus claims his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution were violated. Stumpf also argues that his guilty plea at trial was entered unknowingly and involuntarily because he did not understand the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court, in making its decisions, will have to address the role of the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding, the rights of the defendant under the Due Process Clause, and the extent to which a defendant can later invalidate his earlier plea of guilty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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Brown v. Sanders

Issues

Did the California Supreme Court err by upholding Sanders' death sentence despite the fact that it invalidated two of the four special circumstances used to determine the penalty in the lower court, and failed to reweigh the circumstance or determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?

 

Ronald Lee Sanders was found guilty of murder and other charges related to a 1981 attack in Bakersfield, California. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that there were four “special circumstances” related to his crimes, and accordingly sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the special circumstances, but upheld the death sentence without reweighing whether it was warranted by the remaining special circumstances. The California Supreme Court also failed to specifically find that the presence of the invalid circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and petitions for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that it was unconstitutional for the California Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence without reweighing the special circumstances or finding the error to be harmless. Petitioner, the state of California, argues that the state's sentencing code is not the type of “weighing” statute that would render a death sentence invalid simply because certain special circumstances were found to be invalid. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will significantly impact the prospects for successful appeals or writs for habeas corpus by defendants similarly situated to Sanders.

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Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Is the California death penalty statute a “weighing statute” for which the state court is required to determine that the presence of an invalid special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the jury's determination of penalty?
  2. If an affirmative answer to the first question was dictated by precedent, was it necessary for the state supreme court to specifically use the phrases “harmless error” or “reasonable doubt” in determining that there was no “reasonable possibility” that the invalid special circumstance affected the jury's sentence selection?

At trial in the Superior Court of Kern County California, Ronald Lee Sanders was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, robbery, attempted robbery, and burglary, all stemming from an attempted robbery in Bakersfield, California. See People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 566–67 (Cal. 1990).

Additional Resources

Law about... Criminal procedure, the death penalty

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burden of proof

Class v. United States

Issues

Does a guilty plea inherently waive a defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute underlying his conviction unless that right is explicitly preserved in the plea agreement?

This case will allow the Supreme Court to clarify the appellate rights of criminal defendants who have pled guilty and subsequently want to challenge the constitutionality of their statute of conviction. Circuit courts have been divided on the subject. Petitioner, Class, argues that the Court should apply the precedent set in Blackledge v. Perry and Menna v. New York to his case by holding that constitutional challenge claims do not challenge a defendant’s factual guilt or dispute whether the government met every burden of proving each element of the crime, and therefore are not precluded by pleading guilty. Respondent, the United States, argues that a constitutional challenge to a defendant’s statute of conviction is inherently waived in a guilty plea as an aspect of his factual guilt unless it is expressly preserved in his plea agreement. With this decision, the Supreme Court will determine the constitutional rights of all criminal defendants who plead guilty and likely impact the role guilty pleas play in United States jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a guilty plea inherently waives defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of conviction.

On May 30, 2013, Petitioner Rodney Class (“Class”) parked his Jeep, which contained guns and ammunition, in a parking lot located on the Capitol grounds on the 200 block of Maryland Avenue, SW in Washington D.C. See Brief for Petitioner, Rodney Class at 4–5. While Class visited the Capitol buildings, a police officer noticed a Jeep without the permit required to park in the lot and saw a blade and gun holster inside.

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Concepcion v. United States

Issues

Whether drug offenders that are eligible for a sentencing reduction based on Section 404(b) of the First Step Act are entitled to have intervening legal factors and developments considered at their resentencing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the First Step Act requires or merely allows courts to consider post-sentencing developments during First Step Act sentence modifications. Petitioner Carlos Concepcion argues that the First Step Act requires courts to consider post-sentencing legal and factual developments during sentence modifications. Respondent United States counters that the First Step Act grants courts the discretion to consider post-sentencing developments during sentence modifications. The outcome of this case will impact the sentencing of many low-level drug offenders as well as a court’s authority over resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, a district court must or may consider intervening legal and factual developments?

In 2006, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion (“Concepcion”) was arrested on felony drug charges. Concepcion v. United States at 283. Federal investigators alleged Concepcion was involved in the illegal sale of at least 27.5 grams of crack cocaine and 186.34 grams of powdered cocaine. Id. In 2008, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion pled guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute or distributing at least 5 grams of crack cocaine. Id.

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